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STUDENT MATERIAL

RETROACTIVE LAND STATUTES - INDIANA'S
DORMANT MINERAL ACT DECLARED
CONSTITUTIONAL
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years the legislatures of states with vast mineral deposits have
attempted to construct schemes to resolve effectively the title and conveyancing difficulties caused by missing and unknown owners of highly fractionalized,
severed mineral interests." Stale and abandoned interests are perceived by
lawmakers and commentators as creating uncertainties in titles, inhibiting or
preventing the development of the mineral interests and as impeding the development of the surface estate.' Many of these unused interests extend perpetually, forever clouding titles and posing a threat to the full enjoyment of
surface ownership.' Given the attention focused on the precarious worldwide
fossil fuel situation and the desire to extract minerals at a stepped-up pace,
efforts have 4been made to eliminate obstacles to mineral exploration and
development.
A number of states have enacted dormant mineral statutes.5 The pattern
of these statutory mechanisms has been to provide for the extinction of unused, severed mineral interests unless certain affirmative actions are taken to
preserve those interests.6 The statutes commonly call for either use or periodic
re-recording of the interest.7 Generally, if the owner does not comply the interest lapses and the ownership of the mineral estate vests in the owner of the
surface.8
Dormant mineral statutes have encountered significant constitutional difficulties. The state supreme courts of Wisconsin, 9 Nebraska,'0 Minnesota," and
I Outerbridge, Missing and Unknown Mineral Owners, 25 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 20-1
(1979).
2 See, e.g., Hardy, Ancient Mineral Claims-An Obstacle to Development, 28 INST. ON OIL &
GAS L. & TAX'N. 137 (1977); Outerbridge, Missing and Unknown Mineral Owners, 25 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST. 20-1 (1979); Polston, Legislation, Existing and Proposed, ConcerningMarketability
of Mineral Titles, 7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 73 (1972).
3 See Polston, supra note 2 at 73, 77.
See Outerbridge, supra note 1 at 20-1.
5 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 197-98 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-511-1 to 8 (Burns 1980 & Cum. Supp. 1982); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1163(1) (Callaghan 1982); MINN.
4

ANN. § 93.52, -.55, -.58 (West 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-228 to 231 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 700.30 (West 1981).
a E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1 (Burns 1980).
E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1, -3 (Burns 1980).
a E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-11-1 (Burns 1980).

STAT.

9 Chicago and N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977).
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Illinois" have held such statutes unconstitutional. The 1982 case of Texaco,
Inc. v. Short's presented the United States Supreme Court with the opportunity to address the various constitutional challenges lodged against this type of
legislation. 14 The Court held that the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act was constitutional because it furthers the legitimate state
economic goal of encouraging the
5
exploration and development of minerals.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Indiana Mineral Lapse Act,1 6 enacted in 1971, requires the record
" Wheelock v. Heath, 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978).
" Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 1979), appeal dismissed sub nom. Prest v.
Herbst, 444 U.S. 804 (1979).
" Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill. 2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980).
.3 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
24 It is interesting to note that the Court bypassed the opportunity to review the Minnesota
and Michigan Acts along with the Indiana Act. See Prest v. Herbst, 444 U.S. 804, dismissing appeal from Contos v. Herbst, 278 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 1979); Van Slooten v. Larsen, 455 U.S. 901
(1982), dismissing appeal from 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980).
15 454 U.S. at 529,
'6 IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-5-11-1 to 8 (Burns 1980) provides:
32-5-11-1 [46-1808]. Lapse of mineral interest-Prevention.-Any interest in coal, oil
and gas, and other minerals, shall, if unused for a period of 20 years, be extinguished,
unless a statement of claim is filed in accordance with section five [32-5-11-5] hereof, and
the ownership shall revert to the then owner of the interest out of which it was carved.
32-5-11-2 [46-1809]. Mineral interest-Definition-A mineral interest shall be taken to
mean the interest which is created by an instrument transferring, either by grant, assignment, or reservation, or otherwise an interest, of any kind, in coal, oil and gas, and other
minerals.
32-5-11-3 [46-1810]. Use of mineral interests-Definition.-A mineral interest shall be
deemed to be used when there are any minerals produced thereunder or when operations
are being conducted thereon for injection, withdrawal, storage or disposal of water, gas or
other fluid substances, or when rentals or royalties are being paid by the owner thereof
for the purpose of delaying or enjoying the use or exercise of such rights or when any
such use is being carried out on any tract with which such mineral interest may be unitized or pooled for production purposes, or when, in the case of coal or other solid minerals, there is production from a common vein or seam by the owners of such mineral
interests, or when taxes are paid on such mineral interest by the owner thereof. Any use
pursuant to or authorized by the instrument creating such mineral interest shall be effective to continue in force all rights granted by such instrument.
32-5-11-4 [46-1811]. Statement of claim-Filing-Requirements.-The statement of claim
provided in section one [32-5-11-1] above shall be filed by the owner of the mineral interest prior to the end of the twenty-year period set forth in section two [one] [32-5-111] or within two [2] years after the effective date [September 2, 1971] of this act, whichever is later, and shall contain the name and address of the owner of such interest, and
description of the land, on or under which such mineral interest is located. Such statement of claim shall be filed in the office of the recorder of deeds in the county in which
such land is located. Upon filing of the statement of claim within the time provided, it
shall be deemed that such mineral interest was being used on the date the statement of
claim was filed.
32-5-11-5 [46-1812]. Extinguishment of mineral interest--Exceptions.-Failure to file a
statement of claim within the time provided in section 4 [32-5-11-4] shall not cause a
mineral interest to be extinguished if the owner of such mineral interest:
(1) Was at the time of the expiration of the period provided in section four [32-5-11-
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mineral interest holder to either attempt to discover or produce minerals or to
periodically record a statement of claim, indicating a desire to keep active contact with the mineral estate. Failure to use or re-record the mineral interest

within twenty years, or within the two year grace period granted by the Act,
results in automatic forfeiture of the estate. However, the statute contains an
exception which protects the interests of an owner of ten or more interests in
the same county who files a statement of claim and inadvertently omits some

of the interests. The statute does not require that notice be given to mineral
interest owners before statutory forfeiture of the estate.

Texaco, Inc. v. Short was an action involving two cases which had been
consolidated on appeal by the Supreme Court of Indiana.1 7 In the first case,
the appellants included parties who claimed ownership of fractional mineral
interests that had been severed in 1942 and 1944 and their oil and gas lessees
whose leases were entered into in 1976 and 1977. Under the terms of the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act, the appellants' mineral interests had statutorily lapsed
in 1973 when the two year grace period expired since the mineral interest had
not been used as defined by the Act. In April 1977 the surface owner published
4], the owner of ten [10] or more mineral interests, as above defined, in the county in
which such mineral interest is located, and;
(2) Made diligent effort to preserve all of such interests as were not being used, and
did within a period of ten [10] years prior to the expiration of the period provided in
section four [32-5-11-4] preserve other mineral interests, in said county, by the filing of
statements of claim as herein required, and;
(3) Failed to preserve such interest through inadvertence, and;
(4) Filed the statement of claim herein required, within sixty [60] days after publication of notice as provided in section seven [32-5-11-7] herein, if such notice is published,
and if no such notice is published, within sixty [60] days after receiving actual knowledge
that such mineral interest had lapsed.
32-5-11-6 [46-1813]. Successor in interest-Notice requirements-Prima facie evidence.-Any person who will succeed to the ownership of any mineral interest, upon the
lapse thereof, may give notice of the lapse of such mineral interest by publishing the
same in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which such mineral interest
is located, and, if the address of such mineral interest owner is shown of record or can be
determined upon reasonable inquiry, by mailing within ten [10] days after such publication a copy of such notice to the owner of such mineral interest. The notice shall state
the name of the owner of such mineral interest as shown of record, a description of the
land, and the name of the person giving such notice. If a copy of such notice, together
with an affidavit of service thereof, shall be promptly filed in the office of the recorder of
deeds in the county wherein such land is located, the record thereof shall be prima facie
evidence, in any legal proceedings, that such notice was given.
32-5-11-7 [46-1814]. Statement of claim-Filing-Recorder's duty.-Upon the filing of the
statement of claim, provided for in section 4 [32-5-11-4] of this chapter or the proof of
service of notice as provided in section seven [six] [32-5-11-6] of this chapter in the
recorder's office for the county where such interest is located, the recorder shall record
the same in a book to be kept for that purpose, which shall be known as the "Dormant
Mineral Interest Record" and shall indicate by marginal notation on the instrument creating the original mineral interest the filing of the statement of claim or affidavit of
publication and service of notice.
32-5-11-8 [46-1815]. Waiver of chapter's provisions-Time limit.-The provisions of this
chapter may not be waived at any time prior to the expiration of the twenty [20] year
period provided in section 1 [32-5-11].
17 454 U.S. 516 at 521.
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a notice of lapse of mineral interest in an Indiana newspaper circulated in the
county where the disputed mineral interest was located. Additionally, the surface owner mailed notices to all the appellants except the oil and gas lessees.
The surface owner also filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the
rights of the mineral owners had lapsed. 18
In the second action, the mineral estate had been created in 1954.19 The
mineral estate owners did not "use" the property until 1976 when a coal lease
was executed with appellant Consolidated Coal Co. Because the mineral estate
owners had not filed a statement of claim in the office of the county recorder, a
statutory lapse occured in March 1974. In 1977 the appellees gave notice of the
lapse by newspaper publication and letter. The resulting lawsuit was brought
by all parties in order to resolve the conflicting claims to the mineral
interests.20
In both actions the appellants challenged the constitutionality of the Mineral Lapse Act on the following grounds:
Appellants claimed that the lack of prior notice of the lapse of their mineral

rights deprived them of property without due process of law, that the statute
effected a taking of private property without just compensation, and that the
exception contained in the Act for owners of 10 or more mineral interests denied them the equal protection of the law; appellants based these arguments
on the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Appellants
also contended that the statute constituted21 an impairment of contracts in violation of Art. I, § 10, of the Constitution.
The Indiana trial court found that the legitimate public purpose of the Act
was to "facilitate the exploitation of energy sources. 2 2 However, the trial court
declared the statute unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without due
process and as a taking without just compensation.23 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Indiana reversed.2 4 That court relied on the state economic interest
and the benefit to the society in extinguishing unused mineral interests in order to make the "entire productive potential of the property again available for
human use."25 The court found that the legislature was attempting to encourage the prompt exploitation of minerals in order to create economic benefits for the people and industries of the communities where development would
"' Id. Although the Act does not mandate that the surface owner provide notice to owners of
less than ten interests, in practical application, in order to claim clear title to the mineral interest,
the surface owner must provide notice. Notice is necessary to avoid the possibility that some
holder of ten or more interests might later come forward to claim his rights. The difficulty for
those in the appellants' position is that notice comes too late for the assertion of interests in their
property rights.
19 454 U.S. at 521.
20
21

Id. at 522.
Id..

Short v. Texaco, Inc., 406 N.E.2d 625 at 627 (Ind. 1980), af'd, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
406 N.E.2d at 627.
24 Id.
22

23

25 Id.
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result.2" This legitimate state interest was sufficient, according to the court, to
justify the legislation.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Indiana Supreme Court.2 7 In a five to four decision, the Court held that the
statutory lapse of the appellants' mineral estate did not deprive the appellants
of a property interest without adequate notice in violation of due process.28 A
vigorous dissent argued that a form of pre-extinguishment notice, procedurally
comparable to that statutorily provided with respect to mineral owners of ten
interests 29or more, is consistent with the legislative purpose and constitutionally
required.
III.
A.

PRIOR LAW AND COURT DECISIONS

General Property Law -

The Nature of the Problem

Both common law rules and the commercial nature of severed mineral interests have contributed to the difficulties facing one who attempts to secure
title or development rights to a severed mineral interest. The commercial nature of these interests contributes to the likelihood that the interests will be
owned by a number of people who are not familiar with the property, the surface owner, or each other.30 Interests become fractionalized in the attempt to
spread the cost of acquisition or in the sale of interests for profit.3 1 Problems
often come into existence during periods of active mineral speculation, exploration or development when the mineral estate is divided into successively
smaller fractions and conveyed to opportunists and speculators.2 2 In the wake
of the boom these owners disappear; leaving only their name on a deed for a
perpetual or extended mineral interest.33 Once severed, the passage of time
further fractionalizes the interest through intestate succession. 4
The marketability problems caused by inaccessible mineral owners are inherent in a common law system. The system recognizes that the right to the
privilege and benefit of the minerals beneath the land may be severed from the
fee title and consequently treated as a separate estate in land, fully owned and
enjoyed as a fee itself.3 5 Severed mineral interests are considered corporeal in
nature and have been deemed to have all the sanctity of an estate in land.

28

27
21
29

Id. at 631.
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).

Id. at 538.
Id. at 554.

-0Van Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 45, 299 N.W.2d 704, 711 (1980), appealdismissed, 455
U.S. 901 (1982).
"lSee Kuntz, Old and New Solutions to the Problem of the Outstanding Undeveloped Mineral Interests, 22 INST. ON Om & GAS L. & TAX'N. 81 (1971).
2 See Outerbridge, supra note 1, at 20-3.
Id. at 20-4.
3 See Kuntz, supra note 31, at 81-82.
2d 364, 369, 412 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1980); Wheelock v. Heath,
35 See Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill.
201 Neb. 835, 840, 41, 272 N.W.2d 768, 771 (1978); Chicago and N.W. Transp. Co. v. Pedersen, 80
Wis. 2d 566, 571, 259 N.W.2d 316, 319 (1977).
33
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Under common law they are not subject to abandonment by nonuse., These
doctrines contribute to the continued existence of dormant mineral interests.
Further, the estates are generally immune to the various means, such as adverse possession, tax sales, and marketable title acts, which 37have evolved for
the purpose of keeping property in the stream of commerce.
Dormant mineral statutes constitute a legislative mechanism for dealing
with phantom mineral owners. The objective of the legislation is to keep ownership of mineral interests in a marketable state. Thus, the statutes are aimed
at clearing the records of ancient, unused interests through the concept of
abandonment. As one court has noted: "[t]he abandonment concept,... frequently serves the very useful purpose of clearing title to land of mineral *interest of long standing, the existence of which may impede exploration or development of the premises by reason of difficulty of ascertainment of present
owners or of difficulty of obtaining the joinder of such owners."38
B. Constitutional Challenges in State Courts
Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Texaco, a number of
dormant mineral acts had been held unconstitutional by the highest courts of
several states. 9
1. Nebraska
The Nebraska dormant mineral statute applied to all severed mineral interests and provided that the surface owner may institute an action for the
termination of the mineral interests. 0 According to the statute, a mineral interest was deemed abandoned if the owner had not publicly exercised the right
of ownership by conveyance or other interest of record, by working the mineral
estate through mining, producing or withdrawing minerals, or by recording a
verified claim of interest in the county where the land is located within twentythree years prior to the filing of the action by the surface owner.' If the court
found the interest abandoned, then the interest was extinguished and title
vested in the surface owner.'2

_

In Wheelock v. Heath, the Supreme Court of Nebraska declared the dormant mineral statute unconstitutional insofar as the statute applied retroactively.' 3 The case arose when the owner of the surface and a one-half mineral

interest in the same tract brought an action to terminate and extinguish the
' See Polston, supra note 2, at 73-74.
17

Id. at 74.

Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 887-88, 442 P.2d 692, 711, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 631
(1968). The court held that undivided interests in oil and gas, which California had previously
characterized as incorporeal in nature, can be abandoned by nonuse coupled with the necessary
intent to abandon.
11 See supra notes 9 to 12; see also infra notes 40-88 and accompanying text.
,0 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 57-228 to 231 (1978).
41 Id. at § 57-229.
42 Id. at § 57-230.
43 201 Neb. 835, 272 N.W.2d 768 (1978).
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defendants' record mineral interest. The defendants had acquired their mineral interests more than twenty-three years prior to the filing of the actions
and had not taken any of the steps required by the act to preserve their
interests.
The court noted that at common law, legal title to land could not be lost
by abandonment. 44 The ownership of minerals was deemed a corporeal heredit45
ament with all the attributes and incidents peculiar to ownership of land.
The court found it dispositive that the statute deprived property owners of
their subsurface rights without notice, hearing, or compensation. 4 6 The discus-

sion offered by the court was succinct and little analysis was provided.
2. Minnesota
The Minnesota Mineral Registration Act applied to all severed mineral
interests and provided for the filing of statements of interest with the register
of deeds or titles in the county where the interest is located. 47 Failure to file
the verified statement of interest within the statutory time period resulted in
forfeiture of the interest to the state.48 The Minnesota Legislature provided for
the general advertisement of the registration requirement by requiring the
Commissioner of Natural Resources to publish the statute in a legal newspaper
within each county and in two mining publications having nationwide circulation. 49 The scheme deviated from the Indiana and other dormant mineral stat-

utes in that provisions were included whereby persons claiming an ownership
interest before forfeiture could recover the fair market value of his interest by
commencing an action within six years after forfeiture.5 0 The provisions of the
Minnesota statute expressly stated that forfeiture provisions of the act did not
apply to mineral interests valued and taxed, so long as a tax is actually imposed. 51 The Minnesota Legislature expressly set forth the purpose of the Act
as follows:
The purpose ... is to identify and clarify the obscure and divided ownership
condition of severed mineral interests in this state. Because the ownership condition of many severed mineral interests is becoming more obscure and further
fractionalized with the passage of time, the developments of mineral interests
in this state is often impaired. Therefore, it is in the public interest and serves
a public purpose to identify and clarify these interests. 5'
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Contos v. Herbst ascertained that the
registration and forfeiture provisions were constitutional. 3 However, the court
,4 Id. at 840, 272 N.W.2d at 771.

Id.
Id. at 844, 272 N.W.2d at 773.
47 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 93.52, -.55, -.58 (West 1977).
,8 Id. at § 93.55.
4 Id. at § 93.58.
00 Id. at § 93.55.
51 Id.
" Id. at § 93.52.
45

46

53

278 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. 1979), appeal dismissed sub nom. Prest v. Herbst, 444 U.S. 804

(1979).
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held that the procedures were unconstitutional because the notice provisions
were inadequate in that there was no opportunity for a hearing prior to the
forfeiture."
In rejecting the argument that the registration and forfeiture provisions
violated due process the court employed an economic analysis. "Where an economic regulation is involved, due process requires that legislative enactments
not be arbitrary or capricious; or, stated differently, that they be reasonable
means to a permissive objective."55 The record contained evidence that a large
number of the severed mineral interests are fractionalized and that determination of ownership is time consuming and hinders exploration and development
of minerals.56 On the basis of this record, the court found that the registiation
requirement was not unreasonable.5 7 It was further determined that the means
were rationally related and therefore not violative of due process.5 8
In continuing its analysis, the court found that "[a]t a minimum the due
process clause requires that deprivation of property be preceded by notice and
an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the case." 59 The court relied extensively on Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.60 and determined that the
state's efforts of notification through advertisement of the Act could not be
said to be reasonably calculated to apprise owners of severed mineral interests
of the pendency of the forfeiture. Therefore, advertisement was deemed inadequate where the mere failure to act results in forfeiture of the mineral estate. 1
The court also used Mullane to reach the conclusion that the statutory scheme
was unconstitutional because it presented a clear violation of due process by
failing to provide a pre-forfeiture hearing.2
3. Illinois
A due process analysis similar to that used by the Minnesota court was
employed by the Supreme Court of Illinois 63 in declaring the Illinois Dormant

Mineral Interests Act" unconstitutional. That Act, however, applied only to

Id.
"Id. at 741.
6

d.

:7

Id.

8

Id. at 742.
59 Id.
60 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
[A]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey
the required information, . . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested
to make their appearance....
339 U.S. at 314.
61 278 N.W.2d at 743.
62 Id.

63 Wilson v. Bishop, 82 Ill. 2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980).
"4ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 197-98 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83).
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severed interests in oil and gas. 5 The Act declared that severed interests that
have been unused for twenty-five years shall be deemed abandoned unless the
owners of such interests record a written notice stating a desire to preserve the
interest in the recorder's office of the county where the interest is located. 6 A
devise, sale, lease, mortgage, transfer by recorded instrument, as well as production from land or land pooled or unitized with the interest constituted use
under the Illinois scheme6 7 In the absence of one of the required acts, a statutory abandonment occured and the severed interests automatically vested in
the surface owners. 8
In Wilson v. Bishop, the Supreme Court of Illinois held the Act to be
unconstitutional because the procedural due process rights of the severed oil
and gas interest owners were found to be denied by the statutory scheme. 9
The court began its discussion with a recognition that interests in severed minerals are vested property rights entitled to the customary incidents of ownership. Thus, severed mineral interests were found to constitute protected property interests
entitled to the procedural safeguards which due process
70
demands.
A Mullane analysis was employed, as had been in Contos, and the court
concluded that due process of law prohibited the deprivation of property withto be heard.71 The court held that the
out providing notice and an opportunity
72
Illinois statute violated those rights.
4. Wisconsin
In contrast to the statutory provisions of the Illinois, Michigan, Nebraska
73
and Indiana acts, which affect only unused interests, the Wisconsin statute
required that all owners of severed minerals record their claims and pay an
annual registration fee. Failure to comply resulted in reversion of the interest
to the surface owner. 4
In Chicago and Northwestern TransportationCo. v. Pedersen,7 5 a railroad
company that claimed more than 250,000 acres of mineral interests brought a
declaratory judgment seeking to have enforcement of the Act enjoined. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin declared the entire statute unconstitutional, holding that the enforcement provisions denied procedural and substantive due
process. The decision deemed that the fundamental right to an appropriate
hearing and reasonable notice were lacking in the enforcement provisions of
65 ILL. ANN. STAT.
56

ch. 30, § 197 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-83).

Id.

,. Id.
68

Id.

:' 82 Ill. 2d 364, 412 N.E.2d 522 (1980).
7 Id. at 369, 412 N.E.2d at 524.
71 Id. at 369, 412 N.E.2d at 525.
72 Id.
73

Wis. STAT. ANN.

74

Id.

71

§ 700.30 (West 1981).

80 Wis. 2d 566, 259 N.W.2d 316 (1977).
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76
the Act.

Addressing the issue of substantive due process, the court questioned
whether the purpose of clearing up mineral title uncertainty was so important
as to permit the reversion of mineral rights resulting in a windfall to the surface owner.77 The court found an unreasonable exercise of police power in the
statutory provision that allowed the forfeited rights to vest in the owner of the
surface. The court stated, "[tihis procedure violates the rule that the legislature cannot take private property from one person for the private use of
another." 8
5. Michigan
In Van Slooten v. Larsen the Supreme Court of Michigan held that
State's Dormant Mineral Act constitutional. 79 The Michigan Act 8 o applies only

to severed oil and gas interests and provides that if the owner of the interests
fails to take actual possession, transfer the interests by recorded instrument, or
record notice of claim of interests for a period of twenty years, the interests are
deemed abandoned and title vests in the surface owner.
The Act was challenged on five grounds: (1) the Act unconstitutionally
impaired the obligation of contract; (2) the Act violated constitutional protection against property deprivation without due process of law; (3) the Act violated due process by creating arbitrary and unreasonably conclusive presumptions of abandonment; (4) the Act violated due process because it contains no
provisions for notice or hearing to determine the validity of abandonment
before title vests in the surface estate; and (5) the Act violated the equal protection clause in that oil and gas interests are arbitrarily treated differently
than hard minerals.81
The Van Slooten court initially noted that the severed mineral interests
constituted corporeal hereditaments that could not be abandoned at common
law. 2 However, the Statute was deemed to be an appropriate exercise of the
state police power.8 3 The purpose of the Act was not to pass ownership to the
surface owner, but rather to increase marketability. The resulting increase in
Id. at 570-71, 259 N.W.2d at 318.
7 Id. at 575, 259 N.W.2d at 320.
18Id. at 574, 259 N.W.2d at 320.
79 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 901 (1982). Van Slooten
was a consolidated action; in both actions, surface owners filed suit to quiet title to the oil and gas
interests. In Bickel v. Fairchild, 83 Mich. App. 467, 268 N.W.2d 881 (1978), rev'd sub nom, Van
Slooten v. Larsen, 410 Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980), decided on May 22, 1978, the Michigan
Court of Appeals held the Act to be unconstitutional. Less than six months later, another panel of
the same court, without any reference to Bickel, held the Act to be a constitutional exercise of the
State's police power. Van Slooten v. Larsen, 86 Mich. App. 437, 272 N.W.2d 675 (1978), afl'd, 410
Mich. 21, 299 N.W.2d 704 (1980). The cases had been consolidated for the appeal before the Supreme Court of Michigan.
8' MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1163(1) (Callaghan 1982).
81 410 Mich. at 39, 41, 50, 52, 56, 299 N.W.2d at 708, 709, 713, 714, 716.
82 Id. at 37, 299 N.W.2d at 707.
6'Id. at 44, 299 N.W.2d at 709-10.
16
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the development of fossil fuels would benefit the community with increased
employment opportunities.8 4 The requirement to do certain specified acts to
show ownership was deemed to place no undue burden on the owners, according to the court.8 5
Additionally, the court found that a reasonable relationship existed between the remedy and the purpose. Conceptually, the court analogized the
Statute to both recording statutes and marketable title acts; which have both
been held constitutional. 6 The defendant's argument that the Act created an
arbitrary and unreasonable conclusive presumption of the abandonment was
rejected by the court.
The Mullane analysis was not specifically addressed by the court. Rather,
a balancing test was employed whereby it was determined that the risks of
wrongful deprivation are minimal compared with the interests encompassed by
the Dormant Minerals Act.8 7 Finally, in addressing the equal protection issue,
the court found that the legislature is not required to speak to every aspect of
a problem at once. 8
C. State Court Summary
In sum, the basic constitutional challenges leveled against dormant mineral acts are that the statutes effect a deprivation of property without due process of law, constitute a taking of property without just compensation, and
impair contractual obligations. At the time the United States Supreme Court
tackled the issue, four out of five states had declared, at least in part, that
dormant mineral statutes were unconstitutional.
IV.

A.

SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS

State Police Power

The threshhold question addressed by the United States Supreme Court
in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, was whether a state has the power to provide that
property rights of owners of severed mineral interests shall be extinguished if
owners do not comply with conditions mandated by the state.88 Although the
Court recognized that Indiana considers severed mineral estates vested property interests entitled to the same protection as fee simple interests, the Court
found that states do have the power to permit unused interests in property to
revert to another after the passage of time.8 0 Thus, the Court was not misled
into applying antiquated vested rights doctrines to modern, economic, public
welfare oriented legislation."

81Id., 299 N.W.2d at 710.

83 Id. at 46-47, 299 N.W.2d at 711.
86 Id.

at 47-48, 299 N.W.2d at 712.

87 Id. at 54, 299 N.W.2d at 715.

88 Id. at 55, 299 N.W.2d at 716.
89 Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 at 525 (1982).
90 Id. at 525-26.
91

For a discussion of the Court's treatment of economic and public welfare legislation see G.
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The Supreme Court has, from an early time, upheld the authority of state
legislatures to enact measures that allow unused and abandoned property interests to be transferred to another.9 2 The major feature of any mineral lapse
act is its declaration that mineral interests are terminable. Certainly, the legal
dimensions of mineral interests are not greater than fee simple titles which,
under the laws of adverse possession, are terminable.
Although the Court did not specifically state that it found the Indiana
Mineral Lapse Act analogous to marketable title acts, recording statutes, and
statutes of limitations, the analysis used and the cases cited suggest that the
Court perceived parallels between the schemes.9 3 Indeed, the appellees in their
Motion to Dismiss argued that such schemes serve the same purposes and policy objectives as dormant mineral statutes.9 4 For example, marketable title acts
operate upon record title and render it marketable as against defects arising
prior to the root of title.95 Ambiguities and defects creating doubts concerning
marketability are resolved by the acts. The acts require beneficiaries to rerecord, as is required by the dormant mineral statutes, in order to prevent
forfeiture. Noncompliance may result in a forfeiture of title which at common
law was recognized as fully vested. Thus, like dormant mineral statutes, the
inactivity of the estate holder is the basis of a title transfer for the benefit of
the public welfare. Marketable title acts have not been held to be per se denials of property without due process of law."
Courts have often tended to uphold statutes deemed to alter only the remedies available to enforce existing property rights, but have condemned enactments that affected the corresponding right.9 The appellants in Texaco attempted to characterize the Indiana Act as unconstitutionally affecting rights
as opposed to remedies.98 The appellants' argument was essentially that the
Mineral Lapse Act "allow[s] no cause of action or remedy to arise before the
title owner's substantive rights are terminated, while, on the other hand, statutes of limitation affect remedies only after a cause of action has accrued
thereby allowing the threatened owner his day in court."'9 The Court soundly
rejected this type of argument and noted that when the "practical consequences of extinguishing a right are identical to the consequences of eliminating a remedy, the constitutional analysis is the same." 0 0
As the Court correctly realized, the key inquiry should not be whether the
law affects a right or a remedy, but rather, whether the actions of the state
GUNTHER, CONSTITUioNAL LAW 534-44, 562-69 (10th ed. 1980).
92 See Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457 (1831); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877);
Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902).
93 454 U.S. at 526-29.
0, Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 3, Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
95 Comment, Constitutionality of Retroactive Land Statutes-Indiana's Model Dormant
Mineral Act, 12 IND. L. REv. 455 (1979).
91 See Trustees of Tufts College v. Triple R. Ranch, Inc., 275 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1973).
Comment, supra note 95, at 461.

93 454 U.S. at 526.

90 Comment, supra note 95, at 466.
,00 454 U.S. at 528.
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furthered a legitimate state goal and were rationally exercised. With reliance
on Miller v. Schoene,'1 1 the Court correctly employed a balancing test stating
that the state "has the power to condition the ownership of property on comburden on the owner while
pliance with conditions that impose such a10slight
°2
providing such clear benefits to the State.

B.

Taking Challenge

The Court dealt succinctly with the appellants' claim that the Mineral
Lapse Act constitutes a taking of private property without compensation in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. One of the earliest specific rights incorporated into the due process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment was
the fifth amendment's command that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. However, disagreement has risen as to
when governmental actions give rise to a duty to compensate. Attempts have
been made to distinguish governmental takings from mere regulations.10 3 The
Court apparently ignored such efforts and tersely concluded that "it is the
owner's failure to make any use of the property-and not the action of the
State-that causes the lapse
of the property right; there is no 'taking' that
0 4
requires compensation.'

The Court's conclusion is somewhat unsatisfactory because no discussion
is provided as to whether there is a reasonable relationship between the exercise of the police power and the operation of the challenged statute. However,
in view of the modern Court's expansive interpretation of the police power and
of economic regulations, the majority's hands-off
the Court's lack of scrutiny
05
analysis is not surprising.
What is confusing is that the dissenters did not directly address the regulation-taking issue. Three of the four dissenting justices had recently joined in
the dissent in San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,'0 6 which
provided an articulation of the possibility of compensation in some circumstances. Justice Brennan, dissenting said:
The typical "taking" occurs when a government entity formally condemns a
landowner's property and obtains the fee simple pursuant to its sovereign
power of eminent domain. However, a "taking" may also occur without a formal condemnation proceeding or transfer of fee simple. This court long ago
recognized that "[iut would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in
construing [the Just Compensation Clause] . . .it shall be held that if the

government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses
of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without
101 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding the power of Virginia to destroy ornamental cedar trees on private property that threatened the State's apple industry).
102 454 U.S. at 529-30.
103 See GUNTHER, supra note 91, at 545.

454 U.S. at 530.
105 See GUNTHER, supra note 91, at 544-53.
'0

10

450 U.S. 621 (1981).
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making any compensation, because,
in the narrowest sense of that word, it is
1'0 7
not taken for the public use.
It would seem that an argument can fairly be made that the Mineral
Lapse Act is 'simply a defacto exercise of the power of eminent domain. Although "there is no formula to determine where regulation ends and taking
begins,"' 1 8 the Court has on numerous occasions recognized in passing the vitality of the general principle that a regulation can effect a taking.100 Rather
than chastising the mineral interest owner for neglect, the Court should have
entered into a taking-regulation analysis. This is especially true since the
"State has taken the initiative in seeking to regulate heretofore unregulated
incorporeal interests in land under circumstances in which a need for heightened attentiveness to the law cannot reasonably be apprehended by the mineral interest owner."' 10
What seems particularly unfair is that the mineral interests were created
long prior to the passage of the Act: the Act was passed in 1971 and by 1973
the interest was extinguished. This extinguishment occurs despite the fact that
the appellants have done nothing illegal and have not interferred with the
rights of others. They could have acted to protect their interests only if they
knew of the statutory requirements.
C.

Contract Clause Challenge

The Court also held that the Mineral Lapse Act does not unconstitutionally impair the obligation of contracts.' The determinative factor was that the
leases involved were not executed until after the automatic, statutory lapse of
the mineral rights. 1 2 Therefore, the question was not truly one of impairment
of contract. The leases conveyed nothing since the statutory lapse had already
occurred. The real issue was whether the forfeiture itself was constitutional. As
one commentator accurately noted:
When a dormant mineral statute recognizes a transaction or transfer involving
the severed interest as a "use," thereby preserving title for the record holder,
the contract clause should never come into play. If a gas or other mineral lease
is entered into before the recording period expires, the contractual transaction
renews title for another twenty years. On the other hand, if a lease is entered
into after the re-recording period expires, the forfeiture would have already
occured in favor of the disseisor-surface owner. Such a lease would be void and
therefore could not be impaired. In other words, the lease would not be
abridged by the statute in a retroactive manner since the opetation of the dor-

1*1 Id. at 651 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 17778 (1872)).
108 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
109 See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); United States
v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958).
110 454 U.S. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 531.
12

Id.
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mant mineral law-the forfeiture-occurs before the lease is executed.113

Thus, this aspect of the Court's decision appears to be sound and indeed was
not disputed by the dissent.
D. Equal Protection Challenge
The appellants also contended that the special exception permitting mineral owners to retain an interest violated the equal protection clause. 11 4 To
take advantage of the exception, the owner must have owned at least ten interests in the county, must have made a diligent effort to preserve all the interests
and must have been successful in preserving some. The failure to re-record
must also have been the result of inadvertence and a statement of claim must
be filed within sixty days after receiving notice of lapse.
In the absence of a record containing any factual data, the Court relied
solely on the State's perceived economic interest. The Indiana Supreme Court
had stated:
Minerals exist within the earth in strata and formations which do not necessarily coincide with the manner in which man has chosen to divide the surface
area. Consequently, it is commonly necessary to assemble several mineral interests in order to render the extraction of minerals safe and profitable. The
Legislature could reasonably have concluded that those meeting the criteria set
forth above include those most likely to assemble such interest and actually
produce minerals. The separate classification of interests so held within these
essential clusters is rationally related to the legitimate objectives of the enactnot contrary to the requirements of state and federal
ment and is consequently
equal protection. 115
The Court's conclusion was in accord with other decisions in the area of
economic and social concern where legislative choices are given a great degree
of deference by the Court."1 In New Orleans v. Dukes, the Court noted that
economic regulations are subject to a deferential standard of review, that "the
classification challenged must be rationally related to a legitimate state interest," and that "rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than
mathematical exactitude."' 7 Thus the Court, applying minimal review, found
the legislative purpose of encouraging single ownership of multiple interests to
be legitimate and found that the protection afforded such owners furthered the
Act's purpose.
The difficulty in accepting the Court's conclusion is that the reason for the
ten interest exemption can probably be best explained by recognizing that lobbyists for the larger mineral interest holders were able to effectively protect
themselves while smaller interest holders were not.' 8
:13Comment, supra note 95, at 491 (original emphasis).
114

454 U.S. at 539.

15 Short v. Texaco, Inc., 406 N.E.2d 625, 631-32 (Ind. 1980).
:11 See GUNTHER, supra note 91, at 534-35, 696-97.
17 New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
I'sSee Polston, supra note 2, at 100-01.
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E. Due Process Challenge
The most serious challenge to dormant mineral interest statutes is that
such schemes deny procedural due process. As discussed earlier, several state
supreme courts, by relying on Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Co.,119 have found dormant mineral statutes constitutionally defective as a consequence of the lack of notice and hearing requirements.
1. Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court explicitly determined that the Mullane
rationale does not apply to dormant mineral statutes.120 In so finding, the
Court relied on the notion that "persons owning property within a state are
charged with knowledge of relevant statutory provisions affecting the control
or disposition of such property. 1 21 Emphasis was placed on the fact that the
legislature provided a two-year grace period to allow property owners to become familiar with the statute.
The majority distinguished between the notice and hearing requirements
necessary when an adjudicatory proceeding is held to deprive owners of property interests and the requirements needed for the self-executing feature of a
statute that simply cuts off interests.1 22 The Court found that the due process
standards set forth in Mullane
are applicable only to a judicial proceeding that
123
is to be accorded finality.

The analysis of the Court appears to be logically sound. In Mullane, the
Court concluded that notice by publication given to the beneficiaries of a common fund of a judicial settlement of accounts by the trustee was constitutionally sufficient.12 4 The Court in Texaco attached significance to the fact that the
Mullane opinion emphasized that "[in] the case before us there is of course no
abandonment."1 2 5 But, perhaps the best explanation of the Court's decision is

that it recognized that there were essentially two fundamentally different concepts coming into play in the Mullane and dormant mineral statute situations.
Procedural due process requirements evolved to limit the judicial process
rather than the legislative process. Certainly procedural due process did not
develop to require that the legislature give formal due process notice of every
law passed which may not have been anticipated. Indeed, the Court stated: "it
has never been suggested that each citizen must in some way be given specific
notice of the impact of a new statute on his property before that law may
affect his property rights."1 28
119Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
120 454 U.S. at 535.
121 Id. at 532.
122

Id. at 534-35.
at 535.

223Id.

124339 U.S. at 318.
125339 U.S. at 316.
121454 U.S. at 536.
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2.

Dissenting Opinion

There is, however, a certain sense of unfairness generated by the effect of
the Mineral Lapse Act. In a strong dissent, four justices agreed that the state
had the power to control, limit, and define interests in land, agreed that the
State legislature had legitimate interests in encouraging the identification of
the owners of mineral interests, and even agreed that extinguishment might be
an appropriate sanction for failure to comply.127 The majority and dissent diverge in the amount of importance to be accorded retroactive application of
the statute. The dissenters argued that retroactive application of the statute
does not afford mineral interest owners adequate or meaningful notice of their
duty to act to preserve their mineral interests.128
The dissent recognized that it is generally necessary to charge citizens
with knowledge of the law and that the State cannot afford to notify each
citizen affected by changes in the law. However, the dissent contended that an
unfair and irrational exercise of state power cannot be transformed into a rational exercise merely by employing the legal maxim that "citizens are presumed to know the law."' 29 There are certain limited circumstances in which
reliance on the maxim is simply not consistent with the Constitution.
0
The dissent relied on Lambert v. California'"
for support. Lambert involved a Los Angeles ordinance which made it unlawful for any person with a
prior felony conviction to be in or remain in the city for more than five days
without registering. Ms. Lambert was charged with violating this ordinance
and was convicted, fined and placed on three years probation. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, noting that Lambert's conduct-a mere failure
to register-was wholly passive. The Lambert Court stated: "[t]he rule that
'ignorance of the law will not excuse' is deep in our law, as is the principle that
of all the powers of local government, the police power is 'one of least limitable.' On the other hand, due process places some limits on its exercise." 13
' The
dissent recognized that Lambert involved a criminal sanction and of course
suggests "no general requirement that a state take affirmative steps to inform
its citizenry of their obligations under a particular statute before imposing legal sanctions for violations."2

The dissent believed that Texaco like Lambert, involved "the necessity of
notice in the context of a registration statute sufficiently unusual in character,
and triggered in circumstances so commonplace, that an average citizen would
have no reason to regard the triggering event as calling for a heightened awareness of one's legal obligations." 3 The dissent deemed this to be particularly
true because property owners are not diligent, attentive businessmen maintain-

127
128

Id. at 540.
Id. at 542.

129 Id. at 544.
130 355 U.S. 225 (1957).

,31 Id. at 228 (citations omitted).
112

454 U.S. at 546.

,33 Id. at 547.
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ing daily surveillance over the actions of a silent legislature.13 4 Thus, the dissenting justices concluded that some form of notice is constitutionally required
prior to the extinguishment of mineral interests.
In examining what type of notice is required, the dissenters realized that a
state could not practically inform all appropriate parties of impending lapse of
mineral interests. The dissenters went so far as to recognize that "a state need
not make provision for notice with respect to the retroactive application of a
statute where it would defeat a legitimate state interest, or would be infeasible
in the context of the statutory scheme.' 35 In balancing, the dissent contended
that it was difficult to see "how the state's interest is served by not requiring
the surface owner to notify the mineral rights owner before taking title to his
interest."" 86
In support of this contention, the dissenters noted that as to the mineral
interest owner who owns ten mineral interests in the county, the statute requires notice before those interests are terminated. The person charged with
responsibility for such notice is the surface owner. In practical operation, such
notice will be provided in most cases to avoid the possibility that a surface
owner or potential purchaser would be damaged by the owner of ten or more
interests coming forward to claim his rights.13 7 The problem is that such notice
comes too late for owners of fewer than ten interests to assert their claims. 18
Thus, why not have the same notice requirements for all mineral interest owners? The dissenters concluded that "[a]s applied to mineral interest owners
who were without knowledge of their legal obligations, and who were not permitted to file a saving statement of claim within same period following the
giving of statutory notice by the surface owner, the statute operates
unconstitutionally.""39
The dissent and majority fundamentally disagree about whether the lapse
of mineral interest created by the Mineral Lapse Act is a circumstance so unusual or unique that the presumption of knowledge of the law does not apply.
There is merit in the dissent's argument, particularly since the majority does
not explain how the State's interest would be eroded if the surface owner were
required to give notice.
The State interest in promoting development by resolving conveyancing
problems created by unknown and missing interest holders is legitimate. But
the use of that interest to sustain the Act in Texaco was questionable. The
surface owner's ability to provide mineral owners with notice of the action is
evidence that the mineral owners' identity was known. The mineral owners'
response in defending the action demonstrates that they had not abandoned
their interests.

13

Id.

"I Id. at 551.

1,8 Id. at 552.
137

Id. at 553-54.

138Id. at 554.
139 Id.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court declared retroactive dormant mineral
statutes constitutional in Texaco, Inc. v. Short. The Court rejected the proposition, used by a number of state supreme courts, that Mullane procedural due
process requirements apply to retroactive land statutes. Both the majority and
dissenting opinions placed limits on the application of the Mullane analysis.
Thus, Mullane is specifically restricted to adjudicatory processes and has no
application to situations involving self-executing legislative enactments.
In refusing to accept the notion that the Indiana Dormant Mineral Act
presents an unusual case where the presumption of knowledge of the law
should not apply, the Court ignored the spirit of Lambert. Further, the Texaco
decision represents a move toward a narrow conception of due process requirements when statutes impose an affirmative duty to act and penalize failure to
act with deprivation of a property interest.
Under the Court's analysis in Texaco, the statutes declared unconstitutional by various state supreme courts would pass federal constitutional muster. However, this does not suggest that state courts must henceforth declare
dormant mineral statutes constitutional. Rather, state courts may find that the
state's constitutional threshold is higher than that provided by the federal
standards. The constraint placed on state courts by Texaco is that they will no
longer be able to employ and rely upon Mullane procedural due process requirements to strike the statutes down.
Dormant mineral ,statutes may be criticized on the grounds that their
practical effect is not to clear titles of stale claims, but rather to put clouds on
all mineral titles more than twenty years old whether used or unused. This is
because it is virtually impossible to evaluate whether the interests are being
used, as defined in the statutes, from the land records alone. Further, in many
counties it is extremely difficult to tell whether ten or more interests are owned
by a single party. The net effect of the statutes is to take ownership from one
class of interest holders and give it to another class of property holders.
The acts do not require that the owners actually produce or develop their
mineral interests. Instead, all that is required is that one either use or record.
The only purpose served by such re-recording is to guarantee that mineral interest owners be locatable so that if someone desires to exploit the mineral, the
owner can be easily identified. Therefore, it seems inequitable and arbitrary
that owners who are easily identified are treated the same as problem causing
phantom owners.
It may be reasonably suggested that the state-claimed interest in fostering
further development of a valuable resource is merely a smokescreen for the
desire to eliminate severed mineral owners as a class of property owners. The
primary objective of dormant mineral acts may in reality be to provide for
both a degree of economical and environmental equilibrium between surface
and subsurface rights and ecological reform. Indeed, this was the position
taken by Save Our Cumberland Mountains in an amici curiae brief filed in
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Texaco which urged affirmance of the Indiana Supreme Court decision. 140
The United States Supreme Court did not address this motive, however,
preferring instead to assume that since the purpose of the Act could have been
to encourage development, the Act was a rational exercise of the State's police
power. It remains to be seen whether the Court would view elevation of the
rights of surface owners as an acceptable motive for enactment of a dormant
mineral statute. However, since scrutiny of legislative motive is minimal at
best,141 states will be protected in enacting dormant mineral statutes by simply
asserting development as the motive.
Finally, the result of the Texaco decision will surely be an increase in intensive legislative activity focusing on the problems created by dormant mineral interests.
Deborah McHenry Woodburn

140 See Amici Curiae Brief of Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454
U.S. 516 (1982).
141 See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1981); Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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